Component ^b	Fault/error	Software class		Example of acceptable measures ^{c d e}	Definitions
		В	С		
1.4					
Addressing	DC fault		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
				 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator; or 	H.2.18.3
				Internal error detection; or	H.2.18.9
				periodic self-test using a testing pattern of	H.2.16.7
				the address lines; or	H.2.18.22
				full bus redundancy, or	H.2.18.1.1
				multi-bit bus parity	H.2.18.1.2
1.5					
Data paths	DC fault		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
instruction	and			reciprocal comparison, or	H.2.18.15
decoding	execution			independent hardware comparator, or	H.2.18.3
				Internal error detection, or	H.2.18.9
				periodic self-test using a testing pattern , or	H.2.16.7
				data redundancy, or	H.2.18.2.1
				multi-bit bus parity	H.2.18.1.2
2.					
Interrupt	No interrupt	rq		Functional test; or	H.2.16.5
handling and	or too			time-slot monitoring	H.2.18.10.4
execution	frequent				
	interrupt				
	No interrupt		rq	Comparison of redundant functional	
	or too			channels by either	
	frequent			reciprocal comparison,	H.2.18.15
	interrupt			independent hardware comparator, or	H.2.18.3
	related to			Independent time-slot and logical monitoring	H.2.18.10.3
	different				
	sources				

Table H.1 (2 of 6)

Component ^b	Fault/error	Softwa	re class	Example of acceptable measures ^{c d e}	Definitions
		в	С	-	
3.					
Clock		rq		Frequency monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.1
				time slot monitoring	H.2.18.10.4
	Wrong		rq	Frequency monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.1
	frequency			time-slot monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.4
	(for quartz			comparison of redundant functional channels	
	synchronized			by either:	
	clock:			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
	harmonics/			 independent hardware comparator 	H.2.18.3
	subharmonics				
	only)				
4. Memory					
4.1					
Invariable	All single bit	rq		Periodic modified checksum; or	H.2.19.3.1
memory	faults			multiple checksum, or	H.2.19.3.2
-				word protection with single bit redundancy	H.2.19.8.2
	99,6 %		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
	coverage of			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
	all			 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
	information				
	errors			redundant memory with comparison, or	H.2.19.5
				periodic cyclic redundancy check, either	
				 single word 	H.2.19.4.1
				 double word, or 	H.2.19.4.2
				word protection with multi-bit redundancy	H.2.19.8.1
4.2					
Variable	DC fault	rq		Periodic static memory test, or	H.2.19.6
memory				word protection with single bit redundancy	H.2.19.8.2
	DC fault		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
	and dynamic			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
	cross links			- independent hardware comparator, or	H.2.18.3
				redundant memory with comparison, or	H.2.19.5
				periodic self-tests using either:	
				 walkpat memory test 	H.2.19.7
				 Abraham test 	H.2.19.1
				– transparent GALPAT test, or	H.2.19.2.1
				word protection with multi-bit redundancy	H.2.19.8.1

Table H.1 (3 of 6)

Table	H.1	(4	of	6)
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Component ^b	Fault/error	Software class		Example of acceptable measures ^{c d e}	Definitions
		В	С		
4.3					
Addressing	Stuck at	rq		Word protection with single bit redundancy	H.2.19.18.2
(relevant to				including the address, or	
variable	DC fault		rq	comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
memory and				 reciprocal comparison, or 	H.2.18.15
invariable				 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
memory)				full bus redundancy	H.2.18.1.1
				Testing pattern, or	
				periodic cyclic redundancy check, either:	H.2.18.22
				 single word 	H.2.19.4.1
				 double word, or 	H.2.19.4.2
				word protection with multi-bit redundancy including the address	H.2.19.8.1
5. Internal data path					
5.1 Data					
	Stuck at	rq		word protection with single bit redundancy	H.2.19.8.2
	DC fault		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by eitner:	11.0.40.45
				- reciprocal comparison	H.2.18.15
				- Independent hardware comparator, or	H.2.18.3
				including the address, or data redundancy	П.2.19.0.1
				testing nettern or	
				resting pattern, of	П.2.10.22
E 2 Addrossing	W/rong			Word protection with single bit redundancy	H.2.10.14
5.2 Addressing	address	iq		including the address	п.2.19.0.2
	Wrong		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by:	
	address and			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
	multiple			 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
	addressing			word protection with multi-bit redundancy, including the address, or full bus redundancy; or testing pattern including the address	H.2.19.8.1 H.2.18.1.1 H.2.18.22
6 External communication	Hamming distance 3	rq		Word protection with multi-bit redundancy, or CRC – single word , or	H.2.19.8.1 H.2.19.4.1
				transfer redundancy, or	H.2.18.2.2
				protocol test	H.2.18.14

Component ^b	Fault/error	Software class		Example of acceptable measures ^{c d e}	Definitions
		В	С		
6.1 Data	Hamming distance 4		rq	CRC – double word, or	H.2.19.4.2
				data redundancy or comparison of redundant functional channels by either:	H.2.18.2.1
				 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator 	H.2.18.3
6.2	Wrong	rq		Word protection with multi-bit redundancy,	H.2.19.8.1
Addressing	address			including the address, or CRC – single word	H.2.19.4.1
				including the addresses, or	
				transfer redundancy or	H.2.18.2.2
				protocol test	H.2.18.14
	Wrong and		rq	CRC – double word, including the address, or	H.2.19.4.2
	multiple			full bus redundancy of data and address, or	H.2.18.1.1
	addressing			comparison of redundant communication channels by either:	
				 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator 	H.2.18.3
6.3 Timing	Wrong point in time	rq		Time-slot monitoring, or scheduled transmission	H.2.18.10.4 H.2.18.18
			rq	Time-slot and logical monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.3
				comparison of redundant communication channels by either:	
				 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator 	H.2.18.3
	Wrong	rq		Logical monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.2
	sequence			time-slot monitoring, or	H.2.18.10.4
				scheduled transmission	H.2.18.18
			rq	(same options as for wrong point in time)	
7.					
Input/output	Fault	rq		Plausibility check	H.2.18.13
periphery	conditions				
	specified in		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
	Clause H.27			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
7.1 Digital I/O				input comparison, or	H.2.18.8
				multiple parallel outputs; or	H.2.18.11
				output verification, or	H.2.18.12
				testing pattern, or	H.2.18.22
				code safety	H.2.18.2

Table H.1 (5 of 6)

Component ^b	Fault/error	Software class		Example of acceptable measures ^{c d e}	Definitions
		В	С		
7.2					
Analog I/O					
7.2.1 A/D- and	Fault conditions	rq		Plausibility check	H.2.18.13
D/A- convertor	specified in		rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
	Clause H.27			 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
				input comparison, or	H.2.18.8
				multiple parallel outputs, or	H.2.18.11
				output verification, or	H.2.18.12
				testing pattern	H.2.18.22
7.2.2 Analog multiplexer	Wrong addressing	rq		Plausibility check	H.2.18.13
			rq	Comparison of redundant CPUs by either:	
				 reciprocal comparison 	H.2.18.15
				 independent hardware comparator, or 	H.2.18.3
				input comparison or	H.2.18.8
				testing pattern	H.2.18.22
8.					
Monitoring	Any output		rq	Tested monitoring, or	H.2.18.21
devices and	outside the			redundant monitoring and comparison, or	H.2.18.17
comparators	static and			error recognizing means	H.2.18.6
	dynamic				
	functional				
	specification				
9.	A				11.0.40.0
Custom	Any output	rq		Periodic self-test	H.2.16.6
cnips '	outside the				
for example, ASIC,	static and		rq	Periodic self-test and monitoring, or	H.2.16.7
GAL, Gate	dynamic			dual channel (diverse) with comparison, or	H.2.16.2
array	functional			error recognizing means	H.2.18.6
	specification				
CPU: Central pro	grammation unit	ł			

Table H.1 (6 of 6)

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Coverage of the **fault** is required for the indicated software class. rq:

а Table H.1 is applied according to the requirements of H.11.12 to H.11.12.2.12 inclusive.

b For fault/error assessment, some components are divided into their subfunctions.

с For each subfunction in the table, the software class C measure will cover the software class B fault/error.

d It is recognized that some of the acceptable measures provide a higher level of assurance than is required by this standard.

е Where more than one measure is given for a subfunction, these are alternatives.

f To be divided as necessary by the manufacturer into subfunctions.

H.11.12.2.5 Measures others than those specified in H.11.12.2.4 are permitted if they can be shown to satisfy the requirements listed in Table H.1.

H.11.12.2.6 Software **fault**/error detection shall occur not later than the time declared in requirement 71 of Table 1. The acceptability of the declared time(s) is evaluated during the **fault** analysis of the **control**.

Part 2 standards may limit this declaration.

H.11.12.2.7 For **controls** with functions, classified as Class B or C, detection of a **fault**/error shall result in the response declared in Table 1, requirement 72. For **controls** with functions declared as class C, **independent** means capable of performing this response shall be provided.

H.11.12.2.8 The loss of **dual channel** capability is deemed to be an error in a **control** function using a **dual channel** structure with software class C.

H.11.12.2.9 The software shall be referenced to relevant parts of the **operating sequence** and the associated hardware functions.

H.11.12.2.10 Where labels are used for memory locations, these labels shall be unique.

H.11.12.2.11 The software shall be protected from **user** alteration of safety-related segments and data.

H.11.12.2.12 The software and safety-related hardware under its control shall be initialized to, and terminate at, a declared state as indicated in Table 1, requirement 66.

H.11.12.3 Measures to avoid errors

Control functions with software class C shall have one of the following structures.

For **controls** with software class B or C, means shall be provided for the recognition and control of errors in **transmissions** to external safety-related data paths. Such means shall take into account errors in data, addressing, **transmission** timing and sequence of protocol.

H.11.12.3.1 General

For **controls** with software class B or C the measures shown in Figure H.1 to avoid systematic **faults** shall be applied.

Measures used for software class C are inherently acceptable for software class B.

The content of this is extracted from IEC 61508-3 and adapted to the needs of this standard.





Figure H.1 – V-Model for the software life cycle

Other methods are possible if they incorporate disciplined and structured processes including design and test phases.

H.11.12.3.2 Specification

H.11.12.3.2.1 Software safety requirements

H.11.12.3.2.1.1 The specification of the software safety requirements shall include:

- a description of each safety related function to be implemented, including its response time(s):
 - functions related to the application including their related software classes;
 - functions related to the detection, annunciation and management of software or hardware faults;
- a description of interfaces between software and hardware;
- a description of interfaces between any safety and non-safety related functions.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found in Table H.2.

Table H.2 – Semi-formal methods

Technique/Measure	References (informative)
Standards identification	
Semi-formal methods	
 Logical/functional block diagrams 	
 Sequence diagrams 	
 Finite state machines/state transition diagrams 	B.2.3.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010 C.6.1 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Decision/truth tables 	

Other methods to comply with the requirements can be applied.

H.11.12.3.2.2 Software architecture

H.11.12.3.2.2.1 The description of software architecture shall include the following aspects:

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- techniques and measures to control software faults/errors (refer to H.11.12.2);
- interactions between hardware and software;
- partitioning into modules and their allocation to the specified safety functions;
- hierarchy and call structure of the modules (control flow);
- interrupt handling;
- data flow and restrictions on data access;
- architecture and storage of data;
- time based dependencies of sequences and data.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found in Table H.3.

Table H.3 – Software architecture specification

Technic	que/Measure	References (informative)
Fault de	etection and diagnosis	C.3.1 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Semi-fo	rmal methods:	
-	Logic/function block diagrams	
-	Sequence diagrams	
-	Finite state machines/state transition diagrams	B.2.3.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010
-	Data flow diagrams	C.2.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010

H.11.12.3.2.2. The architecture specification shall be verified against the specification of the software safety requirements by static analysis.

NOTE Acceptable methods for static analysis are:

- control flow analysis;
- data flow analysis;
- walk-throughs/design reviews.

H.11.12.3.2.3 Module design and coding

NOTE 1 The use of computer aided design tools is accepted.

NOTE 2 For Defensive Programming (for example, range checks, check for division by 0, **plausibility checks**), see C.2.5 of IEC 61508-7:2010.

H.11.12.3.2.3.1 Based on the architecture design, software shall be suitably refined into modules. Software module design and coding shall be implemented in a way that is traceable to the software architecture and requirements.

The module design shall specify:

- function(s),
- interfaces to other modules,
- data.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found in Table H.4.

Technique/Measure	References (informative)
Limited size of software modules	C.2.9 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Information hiding/encapsulation	C.2.8 of IEC 61508-7:2010
One entry/one exit point in subroutines and functions	C.2.9 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Fully defined interface	C.2.9 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Semi-formal methods:	
 Logic/function block diagrams 	
 Sequence diagrams 	
 Finite state machines/state transition diagrams 	B.2.3.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Data flow diagrams 	C.2.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010

Table H.4 – Module design specification

H.11.12.3.2.3.2 Software code shall be structured.

NOTE Structural complexity can be minimized by applying the following principles:

- keep the number of possible paths through a software module small, and the relation between the input and output parameters as simple as possible;
- avoid complicated branching and, in particular, avoid unconditional jumps (GOTO) in higher level languages;
- where possible, relate loop constraints and branching to input parameters;
- avoid using complex calculations as the basis of branching and loop decisions.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found in Table H.5.

Technique/Measure	References (informative)
Use of coding standard (see H.11.12.3.2.4)	C.2.6.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010
No use of dynamic objects and variables (see Note)	C.2.6.3 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Limited use of interrupts	C.2.6.5 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Limited use of pointers	C.2.6.6 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Limited use of recursion	C.2.6.7 of IEC 61508-7:2010
No unconditional jumps in programs in higher level languages	C.2.6.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010

Dynamic objects and/or variables are allowed if a compiler is used which ensures that sufficient memory for all dynamic objects and/or variables will be allocated before runtime, or which inserts runtime checks for the correct online allocation of memory.

H.11.12.3.2.3.3 Coded software shall be verified against the module specification, and the module specification shall be verified against the architecture specification by static analysis.

NOTE Examples of methods for static analysis are:

- control flow analysis;
- data flow analysis;
- walk-throughs/design reviews.

H.11.12.3.2.4 Design and coding standards

Program design and coding standards shall be consequently used during software design and maintenance.

Coding standards shall specify programming practice, proscribe unsafe language features, and specify procedures for source code documentation as well as for data naming conventions.

H.11.12.3.3 Testing

H.11.12.3.3.1 Module design (software system design, software module design and coding)

H.11.12.3.3.1.1 A test concept with suitable test cases shall be defined based on the module design specification.

H.11.12.3.3.1.2 Each software module shall be tested as specified within the test concept.

H.11.12.3.3.1.3 Test cases, test data and test results shall be documented.

H.11.12.3.3.1.4 Code verification of a software module by static means includes such techniques as software **inspections**, **walk-throughs**, **static analysis** and formal proof.

Code verification of a software module by dynamic means includes functional testing, whitebox testing and statistical testing.

It is the combination of both types of evidence that provides assurance that each software module satisfies its associated specification.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found in Table H.6.

Technique/Measure	References (informative)
Dynamic analysis and testing:	B.6.5 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Test case execution from boundary value analysis 	C.5.4 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Structure-based testing 	C.5.8 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Data recording and analysis	C.5.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Functional and black-box testing:	B.5.1, B.5.2 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Boundary value analysis 	C.5.4 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Process simulation 	C.5.18 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Performance testing:	C.5.20 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Avalanche/stress testing 	C.5.21 of IEC 61508-7:2010
 Response timings and memory constraints 	C.5.22 of IEC 61508-7:2010
Interface testing	C.5.3 of IEC 61508-7:2010

Table H.6 – Software module testing

NOTE Software module testing is a verification activity.

H.11.12.3.3.2 Software integration testing

H.11.12.3.3.2.1 A test concept with suitable test cases shall be defined based on the architecture design specification.

H.11.12.3.3.2.2 The software shall be tested as specified within the test concept.

H.11.12.3.3.2.3 Test cases, test data and test results shall be documented.

Examples of techniques/measures can be found Table H.7.